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by the recent JPMorgan Chase London Whale fiasco, these 
bank corporate governance issues pose an ongoing risk to 
the financial markets. Hence, bank corporate governance in 
the post-crisis era warrants careful review.
That governance problems can arise in banks is well 
understood (Levine 2004; Bebchuk and Spamann 2010; 
de Haan and Vlahu 2013; Adams and Mehran 2008, 
revised 2011; Calomiris and Carlson 2014). What may not 
be appreciated, however, is the degree to which the unique 
features of banking complicate both the role of the board and 
its governance effectiveness. In an earlier paper (Macey and 
O’Hara 2003), we reviewed the different models of corporate 
governance, with a particular focus on the duties that board 
members owe to different constituencies. We argued that 
these unique features of banks dictated a heightened “duty of 
care” for bank directors.1 We discussed the various legal cases 
defining the duty of care for directors, and how the courts 
have vacillated in their application of these duties owed by 
1 The duty of care is the obligation to make reasonable, fully informed decisions 
and more generally to manage the corporation with the care that a reasonable 
person would use in the management of her own business and affairs.  
1. Introduction
Legislation and regulation, particularly laws and regulations 
related to corporate finance and financial markets, tend to 
follow crisis. The myriad corporate scandals in the 
previous decade led to a heightened awareness of the role 
played by corporate governance, so it is hardly surprising that 
corporate governance has been the focus of regulation for 
some time now. In the wake of Enron, Tyco, and other 
high-profile failures, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
focused on the internal controls of firms and the risks that 
poor governance imposed on the market. In the aftermath of the 
recent financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act unleashed a plethora of changes 
for markets that involved restrictions on what banks can 
do, who can regulate them, and how they should be 
liquidated, as well as mortgage and insurance reform and 
consumer protection initiatives. 
Surprisingly, the duties required of bank directors per se 
were not a focus of specific attention in either act. We believe 
the role that bank corporate governance issues played in the  
financial crisis is not inconsequential and that, as suggested 
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directors. Since then, a lot has changed with respect to banking 
structure and practice, but little has changed with respect to 
the duties and obligations of bank directors. This inertia with 
respect to bank directors is all the more puzzling given that 
Dodd-Frank explicitly addressed the externalities imposed 
by individual banks on the financial system yet imposed no 
additional requirements on bank directors to make them 
responsible for limiting such risks.2
In this article, we propose a new paradigm for bank 
corporate governance in the post-crisis world. We argue that 
bank directors should face heightened requirements owing to 
the increased risk that individual banks pose for the financial 
system. Our thesis is that the greater complexity and opacity 
of banks, and the increased challenges in monitoring these 
complex institutions, require greater expertise on the part 
of bank directors. We propose new “banking expert” and 
“banking literacy” requirements for bank directors akin to the 
“financial expert” requirements imposed on audit committees 
by Sarbanes-Oxley. As we argue, these requirements would 
mandate a higher level of competence for bank directors, 
consistent with the greater knowledge required to understand 
and to oversee today’s more complex financial institutions.
It has been argued that large, complex financial institutions 
are now simply too large to govern—that “too big to fail” is “too 
big to exist.” This may be true, but before we throw in the towel 
on the corporate form of bank organization in favor of some 
regulator-based form of control, we think it makes sense to try 
to craft a more relevant corporate governance standard for 
2 On February 18, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System approved a final rule implementing the provisions of Section 165 
of Dodd-Frank. Under the final rule, U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) 
and foreign banking organizations (FBOs) with at least $50 billion in total 
consolidated assets will be subject to heightened capital, liquidity, risk 
management, and stress testing requirements, effective January 1, 2015, 
for BHCs and July 1, 2016, for FBOs. The final rule was available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20140218a1.pdf, 
but as of May 19, 2014, it was no longer available at that site. As noted 
in Section 3.1 of this article, Section 165(h) of Dodd-Frank requires the 
formation of risk committees of boards of directors at publicly traded bank 
holding companies and companies designated by the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council as systemically important nonbank financial firms. 
banks. Similarly, it has been argued that mendacity is to blame 
for the myriad scandals in banking—that bank management, 
and presumably bank directors, are somehow not sufficiently 
motivated to “do the right thing.” This, in turn, results in a 
culture problem in banking that leads to bad behavior. While 
acknowledging the importance of cultural reforms in banking, 
we argue that operating and monitoring a complex financial 
institution is extremely difficult, and that one solution to 
better bank management lies in better bank corporate 
governance. Our proposals here are a step in that direction.
This article is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
draw on earlier work as well as lessons learned from the 
JPMorgan London Whale debacle to talk about how gover-
nance problems arise in banks and why these problems differ 
from those arising in other firms. We discuss how the growing 
complexity of banks creates a new set of governance problems, 
and how recent structural changes such as dual boards have 
contributed to governance failures in banking. In Section 3, 
we consider how these corporate governance problems have 
traditionally been dealt with in banks, and we discuss recent 
approaches taken in the United States and other countries to 
make bank corporate governance more effective. In Section 4, 
we set out our alternative approach for bank corporate gover-
nance. We argue that bank directors should meet professional 
standards, as opposed to the amateur standards that apply to 
other corporate directors. We propose even more rigorous 
standards for members of bank risk committees, recognizing 
that failures in bank risk management impose significant costs 
on the financial system and on the economy more generally.
2. Bank Corporate Governance: 
Why Is It So Difficult?
Generally speaking, the problem of corporate governance stems 
from agency problems that emerge when the residual claims on 
a firm’s income take the form of shares of stock that are mostly 
owned by people who are not involved in the management or 
operations of the company (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). In order to ameliorate agency costs, over time 
corporate law has developed the general rule that fiduciary duties 
should be owed exclusively to shareholders (Macey 1999). The 
justification for making shareholders the exclusive beneficiaries 
of the fiduciary duties owed by managers and directors is based 
on the fact that creditors, as fixed claimants, can safeguard their 
investments through a combination of pricing and the imposi-
tion of contractual protections such as conversion rights or put 
options (Macey and Miller 1993).
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In our earlier article on corporate governance problems in 
banks (Macey and O’Hara 2003), we argued that banks are 
different from other firms and that the economic policies that 
justify making shareholders the exclusive beneficiaries of 
fiduciary duties do not apply with the same force to banks that 
they do to other types of corporations, such as manufacturing 
or technology companies.3 We believe these difficulties have 
only increased in the past decade, with the result being that 
banks in the post-crisis era face even greater corporate gov-
ernance difficulties. Specifically, we believe that a variety of 
features unique to banks make them more risky, fragile, 
and difficult to monitor and control than other firms 
(Macey and O’Hara 2003, 97).
2.1 Asset Structure and Liquidity 
Creation by Banks
First, because of their unusual capital structures, banks have 
a unique role in generating liquidity for the economy. It is well 
known that banks’ balance sheets are highly leveraged (Bebchuk 
and Spamann 2010; Flannery 1994), with fixed-claim creditors 
supplying 90 percent or more of the funding that banks 
require to operate. Moreover, these fixed-claim liabilities gen-
erally are available to creditors (depositors) on demand, while 
on the asset side of the balance sheet, banks’ loans and other 
assets have longer maturities.
The development of increasingly robust secondary markets 
and banks’ ability to securitize assets has enabled banks to 
move assets off of their balance sheets, but this process has not 
led to a reduction in the size of banks’ balance sheets: banks 
tend to grow rather than shrink even as they securitize more 
of their assets. Because a bank’s more transparent and liquid 
assets tend to be sold either outright or as part of a pool of 
securitized financial assets, what is left on its balance sheet is 
generally the more opaque and idiosyncratic assets. Arguably, 
these evolutionary developments in capital markets have led 
to a secular deterioration, rather than to an improvement in 
the transparency and liquidity of bank assets.
The phenomenon of simultaneously holding transparent, 
liquid liabilities on the one hand and illiquid, opaque assets on 
the other enables banks to serve the vital economic role of cre-
ating liquidity (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). However, to create 
liquidity, banks must lend the funds that they receive from 
deposits and other short-term liabilities, and, consequently, 
banks keep only a small fraction of funds as reserves to satisfy 
depositors’ demands for liquidity. This asset transformation 
3 The discussion here is also reviewed in Macey and O’Hara 2016.
process results in a situation in which no bank has sufficient 
funds on hand to satisfy the demands of depositors if a signifi-
cant number demand payment simultaneously.
The mismatch in the liquidity characteristics and term 
structure of banks’ assets leads to bank runs and other systemic 
problems in the financial system. With greater than a third of 
U.S. bank liabilities uninsured, rational uninsured depositors 
(and claimants) will try to be among the first to withdraw 
before other nimble creditors deplete the banks’ assets. Thus, 
bank depositors, unlike creditors in other companies, are in a 
situation closely akin to the classic prisoner’s dilemma. This 
prisoner’s dilemma can lead to failures in solvent banks 
because the need for liquidity in the event of a run or panic 
can lead to fire-sale liquidations of assets, thereby spreading 
problems to heretofore solvent banks. For bank directors, the 
need to manage such liquidity risks is fundamental to a 
bank’s survival.
2.2 Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard, and 
the Conflict between Fixed Claimants 
and Equity Claimants
The existence of federally sponsored deposit insurance 
means that banks can continue to attract liquidity to fund 
their operations even after they are insolvent. Thus, unlike 
other sorts of companies, it is virtually impossible for feder-
ally insured banks to become insolvent in the “equitable” 
sense of being unable to pay their debts as they come due in 
the ordinary course of business.4 Federal insurance elimi-
nates the market forces that starve nonfinancial firms of 
cash. The federal government has attempted to replace these 
market forces with regulatory requirements, including 
4 In bankruptcy law and practice, there are two types of insolvency. Insolvency 
in the balance sheet sense means that the value of a company’s liabilities is 
greater than the value of its assets. Insolvency in the equity sense means that 
the firm is unable to pay its debts as they come due in the ordinary course of 
business (Jurinski 2003, 33).
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capital requirements and rules regarding the “prompt 
resolution” of financially distressed banks. Nevertheless, 
it seems clear that the well-established tenet of corporate 
finance that there is a conflict between fixed claimants and 
shareholders is, as we previously observed, “raised to a new 
dimension in the banking context” (Macey and O’Hara 
2003, 98). In banking, neither creditors nor capital markets 
have incentives to negotiate for protections against risky, 
“bet-the-bank” investment strategies or to demand compen-
sation for such risk in the form of higher interest payments.
Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) argue that these agency 
conflicts manifest particularly in problems with bank exec-
utive compensation. They make the intriguing point that 
governance reforms aimed at aligning compensation with 
shareholder interests—such as say-on-pay votes, use of restricted 
stock, and increased director independence—fail in banks 
because shareholders also benefit from bank management 
taking on excessive risk. This raises the disturbing specter 
that bank directors are in fact doing their jobs—but that 
their jobs do not include adequately recognizing the sys-
temic risks that banks pose for the financial system.
2.3 Monitoring and Loyalty Problems: 
The London Whale
The moral hazard caused by deposit insurance coupled with 
imperfections in the regulatory system leads not only to excessive 
risk taking by banks but also to an industrywide reduction 
in levels of monitoring within the firm, resulting in a higher 
incidence of large losses and bank failures caused by fraud.5 
The high incidence of fraud is attributable both to the lack 
of monitoring by creditors and to the highly liquid form of 
banks’ assets, which makes it easy to divert bank assets 
to private use relative to less liquid assets such as 
factories and equipment.
Shareholder incentives to prevent fraud and self-dealing 
through monitoring exist in banks as they do in other types 
of companies. As in these other types of companies, 
however, “such monitoring is notoriously ineffective in 
many cases because individual shareholders rarely have 
5 See remarks of R. L. Clarke in Comptroller of the Currency News Release 
no. NR 88-5 (1988, 6) noting that fraud and self-dealing were “apparent” in 
as many as one-third of the bank failures that occurred during the 1980s. 
See also Jackson and Symons (1999, 152), citing a study by the U.S. General 
Accounting Office on bank failures in 1990 and 1991 that reported that 
in slightly more than 60 percent of these failures (175 out of 286), insider 
lending was a “contributing factor.”
sufficient incentives to engage in monitoring because of 
collective-action problems” (Macey and O’Hara 2003, 98).
Perhaps no event illustrates the endemic monitoring and 
other corporate governance problems in the context of the 
banking industry more clearly than the London Whale 
trading loss debacle.6  The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission charged JPMorgan Chase with misstating financial 
results and lacking effective internal controls to detect and 
prevent its traders’ fraudulent overvaluing of investments to 
conceal hundreds of millions of dollars in trading losses.7 In 
the wake of this case, Mary Jo White, the new chair of the 
SEC, deployed her marquee policy to require admissions of 
wrongdoing in certain “egregious” cases.8
The SEC’s lawsuit against JPMorgan charged the company 
with violating provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley relating to corpo-
rate governance and disclosure. In particular, Sarbanes-Oxley 
requires public companies to maintain disclosure controls and 
procedures that ensure that important information reaches 
the appropriate persons so that timely decisions can be made 
regarding disclosure in public filings.9 Also at issue were 
JPMorgan’s alleged violations of SEC regulations requiring 
corporate managers to evaluate on a quarterly basis the effec-
tiveness of the company’s disclosure controls and procedures 
and to disclose management’s conclusion regarding their 
effectiveness in its quarterly filings.10 The SEC also alleged 
that even after JPMorgan announced a trading loss of 
6 Kevin LaCroix, “A Closer Look at JPMorgan’s $920 Million ‘London Whale’ 
Regulatory Settlements,” The D and O Diary, September 20, 2013, available at 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/09/articles/securities-litigation/ 
a-closer-look-at-jp-morgans-920-million-london-whale-regulatory-settlements.
7 SEC, Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to 
Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, 
and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order, available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/2013/34-70458.pdf .
8 See Bruce Carton, “SEC to Require Admissions of Wrongdoing in 
Settlements of Egregious Cases,” Compliance Week, June 19, 2013.
9 SEC Order. Such requirements on internal accounting controls are intended 
to “provide reasonable assurances that transactions are recorded as necessary 
to permit preparation of reliable financial statements.”
10 SEC Order.
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approximately $2 billion on May 10, 2012, the full extent of 
the trading losses that occurred during the first quarter of 
2012 was not detected and reported.11 This failure resulted, 
in part, from the ineffectiveness of internal control functions 
within the bank’s Chief Investment Office, which was known 
as the Valuation Control Group (CIO-VCG).12
Within banks, valuation control units are a critical part 
of internal controls because they monitor and control for 
the accuracy of valuations of the financial assets acquired 
and held by traders and other market professionals within 
the firm. From a corporate governance perspective, it is 
obvious that a valuation control group must be independent of 
the trading desks it monitors in order to be effective. The 
consequences of a corporate governance failure in this 
respect are severe because such failures risk both the inaccu-
rate valuation of the bank’s assets as well as the material 
misstatement of the bank’s financial condition in its public 
filings. In the case of JPMorgan, the SEC found that 
JPMorgan’s CIO-VCG was “unequipped to cope with the 
size and complexity of the credit derivatives” that were the 
principal assets in the bank’s synthetic credit portfolio 
(SCP).13 As of March 31, 2012, the SCP contained 132  
trading positions with a net notional amount of approxi- 
mately $157 billion.14
The SEC also found that the CIO-VCG “did not function 
as an effective internal control” during the relevant time 
period because the CIO-VCG was “understaffed, insuffi-
ciently supervised, and did not adequately document its 
actual price-testing policies.”15 Perhaps more disturbingly, 
it appeared to the SEC that the price-testing methodology 
used by CIO-VCG “was subjective and insufficiently inde-
pendent from the SCP traders, which enabled the traders 
to improperly influence the VCG process.”16 In addition, 
during the first quarter of 2012, CIO-VCG failed to esca-
late to CIO and JPMorgan management significant 
11 SEC Order.
12 SEC Order.
13 The SCP was invested in two primary index groups: CDX, a group of 
North American and emerging markets indexes, and iTraxx, a group of 
European and Asian indexes. Some indexes referenced companies considered 
to be investment grade and others referenced companies considered to be 
high-yield (which generally means that their credit risk is viewed as higher). 
Investors in CDX and iTraxx indexes, including CIO, can be “long” risk, 
which is equivalent to being a seller of CDS protection, or “short” risk, 
which is equivalent to being a buyer of CDS protection. See Annex A to SEC 
Cease-and-Desist Order.
14 Annex A to SEC Order.
15 SEC Order, 2.
16 SEC Order, 2.
information that management required in order to make 
informed decisions about disclosure of the firm’s financial 
results for the first quarter of 2012. As a result, JPMorgan 
did not in a timely fashion detect or effectively challenge 
questionable valuations by the SCP traders as the portfo-
lio’s losses accumulated in the first quarter of 2012, leading 
the bank to publicly misstate its financial results 
for that period.
Another significant corporate governance failure was 
inadequate communication between JPMorgan’s senior 
management and the audit committee of JPMorgan’s board 
of directors. JPMorgan senior management initiated reviews 
of the CIO-VCG’s work after learning of significant disputes 
between the bank and its counterparties about the value 
of the assets held in the synthetic credit portfolio. From 
these reviews, the bank’s management learned that there 
were problems with the CIO-VCG’s price testing and “an 
undue amount of subjectivity” in its control function. 
Contrary to the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, however, 
JPMorgan’s management did not inform the audit committee 
or the bank’s board of directors that it was aware of significant 
deficiencies or material weaknesses in the firm’s internal 
control over financial reporting. As the SEC observed in its 
order, this information must be passed along to the board by 
management to enable “the Audit Committee to fulfill its 
oversight role and help to assure the integrity and accuracy 
of information.”
The internal problems were egregious. For example, when 
losses were incurred on the traditionally profitable SCP in 
the first quarter of 2012, the senior SCP trader instructed 
other SCP traders to stop reporting losses to CIO manage-
ment unless there was a market-moving event that could 
easily explain the losses. At least one SCP trader changed 
his daily marking methodology for the SCP and began 
assigning values at the point in the bid-offer spread that 
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resulted in the highest valuations of the SCP positions, a 
valuation technique inconsistent with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). 17 Things got much worse 
when this trader even began valuing assets at prices that were 
completely “outside every dealer’s bid and offer received that day” 
and thereby “intentionally understated mark-to-market 
losses in the SCP.”18
In JPMorgan’s $200 million settlement of the SEC’s 
enforcement action against it, the bank acknowledged 
significant corporate governance failures. For example, the 
bank admitted that significant facts learned in the course of 
the various internal reviews were not shared in meetings and 
calls among the participants in such reviews. As a result, these 
facts were not escalated to JPMorgan senior management or 
communicated to the audit committee of the board in a timely 
fashion.19 Also apparently missing in action was the bank’s risk 
committee, which was not kept informed of what was 
clearly a gaping hole in the bank’s risk management process.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(the Fed) joined the SEC in suing and settling with 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., the registered bank holding 
company that owns and controls the bank.20 The Fed’s 
order did raise these deficiencies in risk management and 
17 Annex A to SEC Order, 2. Under applicable accounting rules, the positions 
in the synthetic credit portfolio had to be marked “within the bid-ask spread” 
at the point that is “most representative of fair value in the circumstances,” 
with a particular emphasis on the price at which the traders could reasonably 
expect to transact. GAAP also allows for the use of midmarket pricing “as a 
practical expedient for fair value measurements within a bid-ask spread.”
18 Annex A to SEC Order, 3.
19 Annex A to SEC Order, 11.
20 In addition to the SEC’s enforcement action, the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, which regulates the national bank subsidiaries of the holding 
company, and the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority filed lawsuits against 
JPMorgan Chase, N.A., the bank subsidiary of JPMorgan. 
oversight, in addition to concerns with the governance, 
finance, and internal audit functions of the company.21
As we argued in Macey and O’Hara (2003), the mismatch 
between the maturity and liquidity characteristics of banks’ 
assets and liabilities, banks’ unusually high leverage, and the 
moral hazard caused by such institutional features as the Fed’s 
discount window, deposit insurance, and the expectation of 
bailouts largely defined the unique corporate governance 
problems experienced by banks.22 These characteristics 
remain, but the JPMorgan London Whale debacle underscores 
an important new dimension of bank corporate governance 
problems: The opacity of bank activities, combined with the 
complexity of risk management activities involving the valua-
tion and control of complex asset positions, creates significant 
monitoring difficulties for directors.23
Thus, a large part of the problem with JPMorgan appears to 
be that the firm’s directors lacked the special expertise neces-
sary to evaluate the nature and quality of the information they 
were getting (or not getting) from managers (Pozen 2010). 
JPMorgan was not by any means the only financial institution 
whose board lacked sufficient industry and financial markets 
expertise. When Citibank teetered on the brink of insolvency, 
requiring a massive federal bailout, its board was “filled with 
luminaries from many walks of life—It boasted directors from 
a chemical company, a telecom giant, and a liberal arts university, 
for example. Yet in early 2008, only one of the independent 
directors had ever worked at a financial services firm—and 
that person was concurrently the CEO of a large entertain-
ment firm” (Pozen 2010).
2.4 Dual Boards and the Oversight of Banks
Yet another governance challenge arises from the unique struc-
ture of banks, which are largely controlled by holding companies. 
With the conversion of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to 
bank holding companies and financial holding companies during 
21 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Order of Assessment of 
a Civil Money Penalty Issued upon Consent Pursuant to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act, as Amended, September 19, 2013, http://www.federalreserve 
.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20130919a.pdf. 
22 See Calomiris and Carlson (2014) for a discussion of the factors leading 
to bank corporate governance issues in the era predating deposit insurance. 
23 See also Mehran, Morrison, and Shapiro (2011), who make similar 
complexity and opacity arguments in their analysis of governance problems 
in the financial crisis.
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the financial crisis,24 every major bank in the United States is now 
organized as some form of bank holding company (BHC). A 
BHC is defined as a “company that owns and/or controls one or 
more U.S. banks or one that owns, or has controlling interest in, 
one or more banks. A bank holding company may also own 
another bank holding company, which in turn owns or controls 
a bank; the company at the top of the ownership chain is called 
the top holder.”25
Bank holding companies are, by definition, involved in the 
business of banking. In fact, bank holding companies are limited 
by law to activities that are “so closely related to banking as to be 
a proper incident thereto.”26 Because the BHC controls the bank, 
the monitoring and control of risk must take place at multiple 
levels. From a regulatory perspective, the Federal Reserve “is 
responsible for regulating and supervising bank holding compa-
nies, even if the bank owned by the holding company is under 
the primary supervision of a different federal agency,” namely, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) or the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).27 When assessing a 
BHC, however, the Fed will “work cooperatively” with the func-
tional regulator of the subsidiary bank “to address information 
gaps or indications of weakness or risk identified in a supervised 
BHC subsidiary that are material to the Federal Reserve’s under-
standing or assessment” of the BHC.28 This structure of 
24 Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation, has operated as a bank 
holding company and a financial holding company since September 2008. 
It is regulated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Its U.S. depository institution subsidiary, Goldman Sachs Bank USA, is 
a New York State-chartered bank. Morgan Stanley has operated as a 
bank holding company and financial holding company under the Bank 
Holding Company Act since September 2008. It is regulated by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. See http://www.morganstanley 
.com/about/press/articles/6933.html. 
25 Under § 2020.1.3.1 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 
administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), a 
bank holding company is defined as “any company which has control over 
any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company 
by virtue of this Act.” A company is defined as having control over a bank 
or over any company if
a. the company directly or indirectly or acting through one or more 
other persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or 
more of any class of voting securities of the bank or company;
b. the company controls in any manner the election of a majority 
of the directors or trustees of the bank or company; or
c. the Board determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing, 
that the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling 
influence over the management or policies of the bank or company.
26 Bank Holding Company Act. 
27 National Information Center, All Institution Types Defined. Available at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/Content/HELP/Institution Type Description.htm. 
28 The Board of Governors’ Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, 
Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual, § 1050.1.4.1.1 (2011).
supervision acknowledges that bank holding companies wield 
control over the banks they hold.
From a governance perspective, the holding company’s 
board inevitably exerts control over the banks within the 
holding company structure, particularly where, as is often 
the case, the directors of the bank holding company also sit 
as officers and directors of the bank. As such, it is each 
holding company director’s duty to control risk down to the 
level of the banks the BHC holds.29 This means that the  
directors of holding companies, like the directors of the 
banks themselves, must be involved in the governance, 
risk-management, and monitoring and oversight of the 
banks and bank affiliates within the holding company  
structure. The formal corporate separateness of BHCs and 
the banks they control does not release holding company  
directors from responsibility for the actions of their subsidiary 
banks even if some directors are on the board of a BHC but 
not on the board of the bank.30
Howell Jackson has observed that holding companies 
and the banks they own and control are not truly separate 
as a practical matter:
Within bank holding companies, there is a natural 
tendency of management to centralize decision-making 
power and resources in the parent bank or BHC. It is 
doubtful that manage ment would leave the bank and 
nonbank subsidiaries free to make the important 
business decisions as to activities, reinvestment of profits, 
and new markets. It is more likely that there would be 
significant centralization of decision making at the 
parent-company level, with management deciding what 
products and markets will be focused upon and how 
profits will be reallocated.31 (Jackson 1994)
Jackson also argues that this interrelatedness of banks and 
BHCs has increased over time:
Until twenty years ago [or twenty years prior to the 
publication of this article by Professor Jackson in 1994], 
financial holding companies . . . had relatively few 
affirmative obligations with respect to their regulated 
subsidiaries. . . . Over the past two decades however, 
financial holding companies have become increasingly 
embroiled in the regulatory supervision of subsidiary 
financial institutions. (Jackson 1994; interpolation ours) 
29 For further discussion, see Bai (2011). 
30 See, for example, Ellul and Yerramilli (2010, revised 2011) for a discussion 
of BHC directors’ crucial role in risk management of the entire organization. 
31 See also Jackson and Symons (1999, 304).
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Jackson posits that this increased interrelatedness re-
flects a regulatory push to “transfer front-line supervisory 
responsibility from governmental agencies to financial 
holding companies,” a push prompted by the fact that “not 
only are financial holding companies apt to be more profi-
cient than government officials in evaluating institutional 
behavior, but holding companies also can monitor risks at 
a lower cost than government agencies, because holding 
companies already have substantial information about their 
regulated subsidiaries as a result of ordinary managerial 
activities” (Jackson 1994, 513).
The Fed evaluates bank holding companies’ directors 
and senior executives based on their ability to identify, 
measure, and control risk, which includes those risks posed 
by the underlying banks. Thus, the Fed essentially treats 
bank holding companies and their bank affiliates as so in-
extricably linked that, when evaluating BHCs, it analyzes 
the consolidated organization’s financial strength and risks. 
Additionally, the Fed can examine a bank holding company’s 
subsidiaries directly to “inform itself of the systems for 
monitoring and controlling risks to such depository institutions” 
(Macey, Miller, and Carnell 2001, 458).
Since both the holding company and the bank have boards 
of directors, a natural question is what role should each board 
play? Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., general counsel and executive vice 
president of the Legal Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, addresses this point:
We want the governing body of the holding company to 
perform two critical functions. First, we want it to 
understand the risks to the “enterprise,” meaning the risks 
in all of the company’s constituent parts. Second, we want 
the holding company to take reasonable steps to manage 
those risks and keep them within acceptable limits. . . .  
As I see it, the public interest in the bank subsidiary is 
protected by a panoply of prudential laws and regulations. 
The ownership interest of the holding company in the 
bank is protected by the holding company’s ability to 
control the bank’s board of directors. (Baxter 2003, 1-3; 
emphasis added)
From both a regulatory perspective and a corporate 
governance perspective, bank safety and soundness is 
paramount. The well-known “source of strength” doctrine 
requires that bank holding companies provide financial 
support to their banking subsidiaries. In particular, § 225.142 
of the Bank Holding Company Act provides that “in 
supervising the activities of bank holding companies, the 
Board has adopted and continues to follow the principle 
that bank holding companies should serve as a source of 
strength for their subsidiary banks.” This notion pervades 
the BHCs’ corporate governance and directly impacts the 
relationship between the BHCs and their subsidiaries.
It is our contention that the Fed’s BHC regulations, the 
principles of corporate governance developed here, and 
basic concerns about systemic risk and bank safety all indicate 
that bank holding company officers and directors have fi-
duciary obligations that guide—and when necessary, 
trump—corporate form. Fiduciary duties flow not only to 
shareholders of the holding company but also to the corporate 
organization itself. Thus, the responsibility for bank safety and 
soundness must be shouldered both by holding company direc-
tors and officers and by the directors and officers of their 
subsidiaries, particularly their bank subsidiaries.
Less clear, however, is how the shared responsibility between 
the holding company board and the bank board should work in 
practice in the post-crisis environment. On the one hand, it 
clearly makes no sense to say that bank holding company officers 
and directors can ignore issues of safety and soundness that affect 
their subsidiary banks on the grounds that they are fiduciaries of 
a different corporate entity, namely the holding company. On the 
other hand, the notion that the duties and obligations of holding 
company officers and directors and bank officers and directors 
are identical and wholly duplicative also appears problematic. To 
see why, consider the perspective of the OCC, the main regulator 
of nationally chartered banks, on its expectation for the sub-
sidiary bank’s directors. The OCC argues that, “for its part, the 
primary duty of the subsidiary bank’s board of directors is to 
protect the bank.”32 This may be the view of the OCC, but it is 
inconsistent with the duties of the directors of bank holding 
companies, which require that directors of holding companies—
like directors of other firms—maximize value for shareholders.
32 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, The Director’s Book, 
October 2010 (reprinted September 2013), 26.
It is our contention that the Fed’s BHC 
regulations, the principles of corporate 
governance developed here, and basic 
concerns about systemic risk and bank 
safety all indicate that bank holding 
company officers and directors have 
fiduciary obligations that guide—and 
when necessary, trump—corporate form. 
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2016 93
Unlike banks, bank holding companies are, from a 
state-law point of view, garden-variety corporations, with 
garden-variety fiduciary duties that are owed exclusively to 
shareholders. Not only are they subject to the same corporate gov-
ernance rules as other companies, but also, unlike banks, which 
receive charters either from the OCC (national banks) or state 
bank regulators (state banks), holding companies are chartered by 
the same state chartering authorities as any other nonbank. For 
example, Citigroup, which owns a national bank, is chartered in the 
state of Delaware,33 as are Morgan Stanley34 and Goldman Sachs.35 
Thus, there is a significant obstacle to making safety and soundness 
the primary duty of bank holding company directors or of bank 
holding companies. And these holding companies determine who 
sits on the boards of directors of the banks they own or control.
The problem is simple to describe. Because they are consid-
ered to be directors of garden-variety corporations, holding 
company directors (and bank directors too, for that matter), 
ostensibly have no obligation to mitigate risk, but rather are 
tasked with maximizing the value of the companies on whose 
boards they sit. This rule makes perfect sense in the context of 
nonfinancial corporations, whose failure poses no systemic 
risk and whose shareholders can eliminate the firm-specific 
risk of the companies’ business activities easily and cheaply 
through diversification.
However, the federal government, if not the state govern-
ments, wants banks and bank holding companies to refrain 
from engaging in excessive risk taking. Thus, bank holding 
company directors are pulled in opposite directions by the legal 
rules that govern their behavior. On the one hand, as estab-
lished in this section, it is the clear policy of federal banking 
regulators, particularly the Fed, that holding companies—
especially large holding companies whose operations pose 
systemic risks—should focus primarily on issues of safety and 
soundness. On the other hand, the state laws that impose fidu-
ciary duties on the directors of all corporations, both banks and 
nonbanks, require all such directors to maximize the value of 
the firm, even if doing so causes the company to assume 
considerable risk. And, because of the low cost of leverage 
for federally insured banks and for systemically important fi-
nancial institutions of all kinds, these fiduciary duties will 
channel directors toward tolerating, if not actively encouraging, 
risky capital structures and risky investment practices.
33 See Certificate of Incorporation of Citigroup, available at:  
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/investor/data/citigroup_rci.pdf.
34 See Certificate of Incorporation of Morgan Stanley, available at: 
http://www.morganstanley.com/about/company/governance/certcomp.html.
35 See Certificate of Incorporation of Goldman Sachs, available at:  
http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/corporate-governance/ 
corporate-governance-documents/re-stated-certificate.pdf.
One way to reconcile the apparent deep inconsistency 
between the fiduciary obligation of bank and bank holding 
company directors to maximize returns and their statutory 
and regulatory obligations to promote safety is to prioritize 
these conflicting dictates. The regulatory and statutory 
obligations come first. Managers and directors can only 
maximize profits to the extent that doing so does not conflict 
with relevant legal rules and regulations. As the influential 
American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance 
make clear, a corporation “is obliged, to the same extent as a 
natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law.”36 
Or as Milton Friedman admonished, corporations are 
obligated “to make as much money as possible while 
conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those 
embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”37
In our view, the fact that banks and their officers and 
directors can only maximize profits within the limits of 
applicable law and regulations is an extremely important 
feature of the corporate governance landscape. Establishing 
and maintaining this hierarchy, however, does not resolve 
entirely the tension between profit maximization and the 
regulatory and social goals of achieving safer and sounder 
financial institutions. The reason is that, as we have seen 
over the past several decades, financial institutions still 
have latitude to engage in excessive risk taking even after 
they have complied with the law.
For example, banks must comply with the relevant rules 
regarding the maintenance of certain capital levels. But even 
after complying with such rules, banks have ample room to 
maneuver. For instance, they can, and do, invest in the risk-
iest assets within a particular risk-weighting class. They 
also look for loopholes in regulations such as the Volcker Rule 
in order to squeeze the highest returns they can for their 
shareholders; of course, this quest for the highest returns 
involves risk, which is not something that regulators are 
interested in maximizing.
But the fiduciary duty to maximize profits is not the only 
obstacle to reaching the goal of incentivizing managers and 
directors of financial institutions to focus as intensely on keeping 
36 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance, Section 2.01(b).
37 Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits,” The New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970.
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banks safe as directors of other companies focus on maximizing 
share prices. In addition to the fact that they have fiduciary  
duties, it is the case that holding company directors, like the 
directors of all other corporations, are elected by shareholders. 
Fixed and contingent claimants, such as depositors, nondepositor 
creditors, and the U.S. government, lack voting power. In an elec-
tion between a risk taker and an individual who avoids taking 
risks, the shareholders will vote for the risk taker. Thus, to the 
extent that bank or bank holding company directors are able 
to survive in their jobs in the Darwinian environment that 
characterizes the democratic process, among the strongest 
characteristics for survival is a strong proclivity for risk taking.38
3. Bank Corporate Governance: 
Solutions Past and Present
How to resolve the unique moral hazard and corporate gover-
nance problems of banks is a matter of long-standing debate. 
Certainly these problems explain, at least in part, why banks 
are—and long have been—the subject of much more intensive 
regulation than virtually all other forms of business.39 The fact 
that safeguards for creditors of banks existed long before deposit 
insurance made the government a contingent claimant on banks’ 
cash flows supports our argument that banks are unique in their 
susceptibility to insolvency. Moreover, the fact that the power of 
these safeguards has diminished in certain significant ways is 
highly relevant to our analysis of how to restructure bank corpo-
rate governance in the post-crisis era. In this section, we consider 
the varied ways that bank governance issues have been addressed 
in the past, and some new approaches being proposed and imple-
mented in locales both within and outside of the United States.
3.1 Heightened Regulation
Banks are subject to myriad special regulations. The periodic 
reporting and on-site inspections required by federal and state 
regulators are only the beginning. Many regulations actually 
38 This argument may explain the empirical finding by Laeven and Levine 
(2009) that ownership by more institutional investors increases the 
riskiness of the bank.
39 With the possible exception of companies that manufacture and use nuclear 
material, banking is the most regulated industry in the United States. The 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for regulating 
commercial and institutional uses of nuclear materials, including nuclear 
power plants. Founded in 1975, the NRC sets limits on radiation exposure 
from the radioactive materials it licenses and requires those with licenses to 
keep exposures well below these limits (Fisher 2012).
require bank regulators to make subjective determinations of 
the quality of bank management. This is a responsibility virtu-
ally unheard of in a free-market, private enterprise system. In 
such systems, shareholders generally have plenary authority to 
decide who manages the companies in which they have invested.
For U.S. commercial banks, regulators use the Uniform 
Financial Institutions Rating system, generally referred 
to as CAMELS, to evaluate banks’ financial soundness.40 
The CAMELS system evaluates banks’ capital adequacy, 
asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity 
to market risk. Each of these assessments requires regulators 
to evaluate the quality of bank management. For example, a 
bank’s capital adequacy (“C”) will depend, in part, on 
management’s ability to identify, measure, monitor, and 
control risks. Assessments of asset quality (“A”) require that 
regulators evaluate assets in light of management’s ability 
to identify, measure, monitor, and control credit risk. The 
management criterion (“M”) reflects the judgment of a 
bank’s primary regulator about the ability of the bank’s 
board of directors and senior officers to identify, measure, 
monitor, and control the risks of the bank’s activities and to 
assure the bank’s safe and efficient operation in compliance 
with applicable laws. Other criteria evaluate the quality of 
the control systems implemented by management as well as 
the banks’ funds-management practices.
Banks whose management is deemed inadequate may be 
categorized as unsafe and unsound, and are subject to enforce-
ment action, including closure. In addition to implementing 
the CAMELS system, regulators are required, under the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA), to promulgate safety and soundness standards for 
banks’ internal controls, information systems, and internal 
audit systems; loan documentation; credit underwriting; 
40 See Macey, Miller, and Carnell (2001, 434). The explication of the rating 
system in this paragraph draws heavily from pages 434-5 of this source.
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interest rate exposure; asset growth; compensation, fees, and 
benefits; and asset quality, earnings, and stock valuation.41
Bank regulators also have the power to remove officers and 
directors, to ban these persons from ever working for a bank, 
and to impose civil monetary penalties against a banking in-
stitution and its affiliates. So-called prompt corrective-action 
powers allow regulators to regulate every significant opera-
tional aspect of a bank.42 This oversight means that corporate 
governance is no longer the ambit of the bank’s owners, but 
rather is conducted through an odd (at least relative to other 
firms) shared-custody arrangement with the regulators.
There are clearly problems with this hybrid approach. As ob-
served previously, replacing private sector creditors with public 
sector regulators as the first line of defense against bank fraud 
and self-dealing creates two problems. First, private sector cred-
itors have stronger incentives than public sector regulators to 
monitor closely for fraud and self-dealing because the creditors’ 
own money is on the line, while the regulators’ money is not. 
Unlike regulators, private sector creditors will monitor until the 
losses avoided from such monitoring equal the marginal cost of 
such activity. Second, because of the lack of private sector 
market discipline, insufficient incentives exist for bankers to 
develop mechanisms for providing depositors and creditors 
with credible assurances that they will refrain from fraudulent 
activities (Macey and O’Hara 2003, 98-99).
These difficulties may explain why even embedding regula-
tors in the bank has not proved effective. Rather than reporting 
to an office in a government building, embedded regulators 
work inside the private sector institutions to which they have 
been assigned. At JPMorgan Chase, approximately forty 
examiners from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and 
seventy examiners from the OCC were embedded in the bank 
at the time of the London Whale episode. Yet, the trading losses 
from that episode were not monitored by embedded regula-
tors because the regulators did not embed any examiners in 
the unit’s offices in either London or New York. Instead, the 
41 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1.
42 As a practical matter, the FDIC’s power to revoke a bank’s deposit insurance 
conveys similar power.
unit was examined periodically by embedded examiners 
from other offices of the firm.
The relative lack of oversight of JPMorgan’s Chief Investment 
Office by the legion of regulators embedded in the bank ap-
parently was the result of a lack of understanding of what the 
office did. Generally speaking, banks’ investment offices, 
known as Treasury units, restrict their activities to hedging 
and making low-risk, short-term investments with cash on 
hand. In contrast, the Treasury unit at JPMorgan had a portfo-
lio of almost $400 billion. Far from limiting itself to hedging, 
the unit had become a profit center that made large bets and 
claimed to have recorded $5 billion in profit over the three  
years through 2011.43 This episode strongly suggests that there 
are limits to the efficacy of embedded regulators in curtailing 
risk in the bank.
Section 165(h) of Dodd-Frank requires the Fed to issue 
regulations requiring systemically important financial institu-
tions (SIFIs) and publicly traded bank holding companies to 
establish risk committees. Risk committees must have a 
formal written charter approved by the board of directors, 
must meet regularly, and must fully document their meetings 
and their risk management decisions. The specific 
responsibility of a SIFI’s risk committee is to oversee:
an enterprise-wide risk management framework, which 
will vary based on [the SIFI’s] complexity, size, and 
inherent level of risk posed to the U.S. financial system. 
This framework would include (1) risk limitations 
appropriate to each business line of the company; 
(2) appropriate policies and procedures for risk 
management governance, practices, and infrastructure; 
(3) processes and systems for identifying and reporting 
risks; (4) monitoring compliance and implementing 
timely corrective actions; and (5) integrating risk 
management and control objectives with management’s 
goals and the company’s compensation structure.44
These risk committees must take responsibility for the 
oversight of enterprise-wide risk management practices of the 
company, have at least one director with expertise in risk 
management, and be chaired by an independent director. 
Risk committees face certain procedural requirements.
43 These standards would also apply to insured federal savings associations and 
to insured federal branches of foreign banks with average total consolidated 
assets of $50 billion or more. See Silver-Greenberg and Protess (2012).
44 Paul Hastings LLP Global Banking and Payment Systems Practice, 
“Federal Reserve Unveils Proposal on Dodd-Frank Enhanced Prudential 
Requirements and Early Remediation Requirements,” January 2012, available 
at http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/2082.pdf 
(accessed May 19, 2014). 
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In order for a director to qualify as independent, the 
company must indicate in its securities filings that the director 
satisfies the independence requirements established by the 
exchange on which the company’s securities are listed. For 
companies whose shares are not publicly traded in the 
United States, the proposed rule provides that “the director 
is independent only if the company demonstrates to the 
satisfaction of the Federal Reserve that such director would 
qualify as an independent director under the listing standards 
of a securities exchange, if the company were publicly traded 
on such an exchange.” Other specific requirements for risk 
committees are that they must report directly to the firm’s 
board of directors, and not be a part of any other committee 
of the board, such as the audit committee. The director of the 
risk committee must not be an employee of the bank holding 
company and must not have been an officer or employee of 
the bank holding company during the previous three years. It 
would seem appropriate for the members of the risk 
committee, including the director of the risk committee, 
also to be members of the board of directors of the bank. 
Of course, the director of the risk committee would have to 
be an independent board member of the holding company, 
because employees of the holding company are prohibited 
from serving on the risk committee. Overlap between 
board members of the holding company and the subsidiary 
bank will ensure that information flows freely from the 
subsidiary to the parent and that the local knowledge and 
expertise of parent-company directors and officers are 
available to the bank.
In addition to requiring that bank holding companies and 
SIFIs have risk committees, Section 165(h) of Dodd-Frank 
states that the boards of directors of such companies must 
appoint a chief risk officer (CRO) to develop and maintain 
risk-management practices for the entire firm. Specifically, the 
CRO is responsible for (1) allocating responsibility for monitor-
ing and compliance with delegated risk limits; (2) establishing 
appropriate policies and procedures for risk management gover-
nance, practices, and controls; (3) developing processes and 
systems for identifying and reporting risks; (4) monitoring and 
testing these controls; and (5) ensuring that risk management 
issues are effectively resolved in a timely manner. The CRO’s risk 
management expertise should be appropriate to the company’s 
capital structure, complexity, activities, and size. Additionally, this 
officer would report directly to the risk committee and CEO and 
have a compensation structure designed to provide an objective 
assessment of the risks taken by the company.45
Further, with respect to requirements on boards of direc-
tors, on January 16, 2014, the OCC proposed minimum 
standards for the design and implementation of risk gover-
nance frameworks by large insured national banks, and 
minimum standards for boards of directors in overseeing the 
frameworks’ design and implementation.46 The OCC also pro-
posed a new statute authorizing the agency to prescribe 
operational and managerial standards for national banks and 
federal savings associations.47 This proposal represents a new, 
and remarkably detailed, regulatory mandate regarding bank 
governance activities and responsibilities.
In its request for public comments on its proposed 
minimum standards, the OCC observed that “since large 
banks are often one of several legal entities under a complex 
parent company, each bank’s board must ensure that the bank 
does not function simply as a booking entity for its parent, 
and that parent-company decisions do not jeopardize the 
safety and soundness of the bank. This often requires separate 
and focused governance and risk management practices.”48
The OCC proposal articulates several other expectations. 
These include the expectation that large institutions have a 
“well-defined personnel management program that ensures 
appropriate staffing levels, provides for orderly succession, and 
provides for compensation tools to appropriately motivate 
and retain talent, [and] that does not encourage imprudent 
risk taking,”49 and a requirement that institutions define and 
communicate “an acceptable risk appetite across the organization, 
including measures that address the amount of capital, earn-
ings, or liquidity that may be at risk on a firmwide basis, the 
amount of risk that may be taken in each line of business, and 
45 Paul Hastings LLP Global Banking and Payment Systems Practice, 
“Federal Reserve Unveils Proposal,” Insights, January 5, 2012, available at  
http://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id 
=9629de69-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded.
46 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “OCC Guidelines Establishing 
Heightened Standards for Certain Large Insured National Banks, Insured Federal 
Savings Associations, and Insured Federal Branches; Integration of 12 CFR Parts 
30 and 170.” 79 Federal Register, Part VI, 54517-49; 12 CFR Parts 30, 168, and 
170 (September 11, 2014). The guidelines would be issued and enforceable under 
Section 39 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which authorizes the OCC to 
prescribe safety and soundness standards. 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1.
47 OCC Guidelines, 5.
48 OCC Guidelines, 5.
49 OCC Guidelines, 5.
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the amount of risk that may be taken in each key risk category 
monitored by the institution.”50
Additionally, the OCC “expects institutions to have reliable 
oversight programs, including the development and mainte-
nance of strong audit and risk management functions. This 
expectation involves institutions comparing the performance 
of their audit and risk management functions to the OCC’s 
standards and leading industry practices and taking appropri-
ate action to address material gaps.”51 The OCC proposal also 
“focuses on the board of directors’ willingness to provide a 
credible challenge to bank management’s decision-making 
and thus requests independent directors to acquire a thorough 
understanding of an institution’s risk profile and to use 
this information to ask probing questions of management and 
to ensure that senior management prudently addresses risks.”52
A bank can use its parent company’s risk governance profile 
to satisfy the OCC’s new guidelines if the parent’s risk profile is 
substantially the same as its own risk profile.53 If not, the bank 
must come up with its own risk governance framework. A bank 
may, in consultation with OCC examiners, use components of 
its parent’s risk governance framework but should ensure that 
the risk profile of the bank is easily distinguished and separate 
from that of its parent for risk management and supervisory re-
porting purposes, and that the bank’s safety and soundness 
is not jeopardized by decisions made by the parent’s board 
of directors and management.54
The OCC’s guidelines also set out minimum standards 
for the design and implementation of banks’ frameworks 
for risk management. Every bank would have to establish 
and adhere to a formal, written framework that covers: 
(1) credit risk, (2) interest rate risk, (3) liquidity risk, 
(4) price risk, (5) operational risk, (6) compliance risk, 
(7) strategic risk, and (8) reputation risk. Each bank’s 
framework must also account for the risks to the bank’s 
earnings, capital, liquidity, and reputation that arise from all 
of its activities.
50 OCC Guidelines, 5.
51 OCC Guidelines, 5-6.
52 OCC Guidelines, 6.
53 The risk profiles of a parent company and a bank would be considered 
substantially the same if, as of the most recent quarter-end Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council Consolidated Report of Condition and 
Income, or Call Report, the following conditions are met: (1) the bank’s 
average total consolidated assets represent 95 percent or more of the parent 
company’s average total consolidated assets; (2) the bank’s total assets under 
management represent 95 percent or more of the parent company’s total 
assets under management; and (3) the bank’s total off-balance-sheet exposures 
represent 95 percent or more of the parent company’s total off-balance-sheet 
exposures (“OCC Guidelines,” 11).
54 “OCC Guidelines,” 11.
The OCC identifies three “lines of defense” for bank risk: 
front-line units, independent risk management, and internal 
audit. The three units should remain independent of one 
another. The bank’s board of directors and its CEO retain sub-
stantial responsibility for risk management. But, as a law firm 
with substantial experience in representing banks before the 
OCC has observed, “if adopted as proposed, the Guidelines’ 
detailed requirements regarding roles, responsibilities, and 
reporting structures would represent a significantly enhanced 
level of regulatory intervention into bank management and 
internal processes.”55
The OCC’s proposed guidelines impose specific 
risk-management-related responsibilities on the CEO 
and new standards for banks’ boards of directors.56 These 
board standards stipulate that:
1. Each member of the bank’s board of directors has a duty to 
oversee the bank’s compliance with safe and sound banking 
practices. Consistent with this duty, the board of directors 
should ensure that the bank establishes and implements an 
effective risk governance framework that meets the 
minimum standards described in these guidelines. The 
board of directors or the board’s risk committee should 
approve any changes to the risk governance framework.
2.  The bank’s board of directors actively oversees the 
bank’s risk-taking activities and holds management 
accountable for adhering to the risk governance 
framework. In providing active oversight, the board 
of directors should question, challenge, and when 
necessary, oppose recommendations and decisions 
made by management that could cause the bank’s risk 
profile to exceed its risk appetite or jeopardize the 
safety and soundness of the bank.
3. When carrying out his or her duties, each member 
of the board of directors should exercise sound, 
independent judgment.
55 Sullivan and Cromwell, LLP, “Heightened Risk Governance Standards for 
Banks and Bank Boards of Directors: Proposed OCC ‘Guidelines’ Would 
Establish Heightened Standards for Large National Banks’ Risk Governance 
Frameworks and Boards of Directors, and Accelerate Trends of Regulatory 





56 Under the OCC guidelines, the CEO is responsible for developing a strategic 
plan of at least three years that includes a comprehensive assessment of risks to 
the bank during the time period covered by the plan, along with an explanation 
of how the bank will update the framework to account for changes in the bank’s 
risk profile. The strategic plan must be approved by the bank’s board of directors 
and reviewed, updated, and approved to reflect changes in the bank’s risk profile 
or operating environment. The CEO is also required to oversee the day-to-day 
activities of the chief risk executive and the chief accounting executive.
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4. At least two members of the board of directors should 
not be members of (either) the bank’s management or the 
parent company’s management.57
5.  The board of directors should establish and adhere to a 
formal, ongoing training program for independent directors. 
This program should include training on (a) complex 
products, services, lines of business, and risks that have 
a significant impact on the bank; (b) laws, regulations, 
and supervisory requirements applicable to the bank; and 
(c) other topics identified by the board of directors.58
6. The bank’s board of directors should conduct an annual 
self-assessment that includes an evaluation of its effectiveness 
in meeting the standards for directors contained in 
section III of the OCC guidelines.59
The OCC’s proposed rule posits that “one of the primary 
fiduciary duties of a Bank’s Board is to ensure that the institu-
tion operates in a safe and sound manner.” As Sullivan and 
Cromwell’s memorandum points out,
This statement is troublesome in multiple respects. 
First, it provides that the Board has an obligation to 
“ensure” a result, which is a standard that is beyond 
existing law and often achievability. Second, there 
may be an implicit suggestion that this “fiduciary 
duty” is owed to someone, e.g., the OCC, other than 
the shareholder(s). Third, the statement suggests that 
there is a separate fiduciary duty beyond the two 
widely recognized duties of loyalty and care.60
The OCC also asserts that boards of directors of national 
banks “must ensure . . . that parent company decisions and 
‘complex banking structures’ do not jeopardize the safety and 
soundness of the bank.”61 This is a strange assertion in light of 
the fact that it is the Fed, and not the OCC, that regulates the 
57 The OCC requests comment regarding the composition of a bank’s board, 
including whether the minimum number of two independent directors 
required under the guidelines is the appropriate number, whether there are 
other standards the OCC should consider to ensure the board’s composition 
is adequate to provide effective oversight of the bank, and whether there is 
value in requiring the bank to maintain its own risk committee and other 
committees, as opposed to permitting the bank’s board to leverage the 
parent’s board committees.
58 This requirement is along the lines of a policy suggested by Acharya et al. 
(2009) that independent board members be educated in the operational 
details and complex procedures of large complex financial institutions.
59 “OCC Guidelines,” 75-8.
60 Sullivan and Cromwell, 11.
61 “OCC Guidelines,” 75.
parent companies of banks. Given this fact, it is not clear how 
this could be accomplished.”62 
The OCC’s proposed guidelines represent the most complete 
articulation to date of the expectations that regulators have for 
bank directors with regard to ensuring the safety and soundness 
of banks. These guidelines raise more questions than they 
answer. In particular, there is no indication of where profit maxi-
mization fits into the OCC’s vision of bank corporate governance. 
Even more significantly, there is no indication of how the com-
peting duties and responsibilities of bank and holding company 
directors are to be reconciled. In other words, as so often is the 
case, the regulations purport to compel behavior without taking 
into account the incentives of the regulated officers and directors. 
This is particularly relevant in light of the fact that officers and di-
rectors of banks likely are interested in such things as promotions, 
compensation, and continued tenure in their jobs—and it is the 
holding companies, not the OCC, that controls these matters.
3.2 Multiple Liability for Bank Shareholders
The system of double and sometimes triple liability for bank 
shareholders was an ingenious device for dealing with banks’ 
moral hazard and balance sheet instability. In the late nine-
teenth century, decades before deposit insurance was 
introduced, states imposed double, triple, and, in the cases of 
New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, even unlimited “joint and 
several liability”63 on bank shareholders. These state laws pre-
vented the issuance of corporate charters to banks whose 
shareholders did not agree to pay up to the amount of their 
original investment into the estate of the bank if it ever should 
become insolvent. The National Bank Act of 1863 extended 
this liability regime to shareholders in national banks, requir-
ing that “each shareholder shall be liable to the amount of the 
par value of the shares held by him, in addition to the amount 
invested in such shares.”64
The historical system of multiple liability for bank share-
holders did more than protect depositors and other creditors 
from the consequences of bank failure ex post. It also had the 
effect of reducing moral hazard ex ante because shareholders, 
who controlled banks’ boards of directors, realized that they 
would be personally liable for much, if not all, of the negative 
62 Sullivan and Cromwell, 11.
63 Joint and several liability is a liability designation in civil cases that provides 
that all defendants are responsible individually, as well as collectively, for 
100 percent of the damages. Successful plaintiffs in cases in which joint and 
several liability is imposed may elect to collect the entire judgment from a 
single party, or from multiple parties in various amounts.
64 National Banking Act of 1863, Ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665.
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consequences of excessive risk taking. And multiple liability 
worked to stem depositors’ losses in the Great Depression, 
despite the very large number of bank failures.65 In other 
words, shareholders, not depositors, internalized the costs of 
bank failures before the Banking Act of 1933 initiated de jure 
deposit insurance for all deposit accounts under the statutory 
limit (currently $250,000).66 Deposit insurance made the 
pre-Depression multiple liability regimes unnecessary from 
the point of view of many depositors. On the supply side, the 
credit enhancement for depositors provided by multiple 
liability was replaced by the credit enhancement provided by 
deposit insurance. As a result, banks no longer faced the same 
demand for a mechanism to signal that they would keep 
moral hazard in check. By 1935, the federal and state multiple 
liability regimes had been eliminated.67
To a very large extent, all of the modern banking regula-
tions that we observe, including capital requirements, reserve 
requirements, enhanced supervision, embedded regulators, 
and prompt intervention, have arisen because much of the 
cost of bank failure has shifted from bank shareholders to 
bank regulators.
3.3 Capital and Liquidity Requirements
In general, there are no laws requiring companies to main-
tain any particular level of capital as a protective cushion 
for creditors and other constituencies. Of course, this is not 
the case in banking. Capital requirements of various sorts, 
65 During the period of the Great Depression (1929-1933), although 
9,000 banks failed or suspended operations, depositor losses amounted to 
only $1.3 billion, a figure that pales in comparison to the $85 billion in losses 
borne by holders of common and preferred stock over the same timeframe 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 440). During the Depression era, the 
number of banks in the United States fell from 24,633 to 15,015, a decline 
of 39 percent. The 5,712 banks that failed during this time had total deposits 
of $1.6 billion. Total losses to depositors were $565 million, which was 
1 percent of average deposits during this period (Calomiris 2013, 166).
66 Macey and O’Hara (2003, 100).
67 Macey and O’Hara (2003, 100).
including simple limits on overall leverage and various 
forms of risk-based capital rules, are a standard feature of 
bank regulation. The purpose of these capital requirements 
is to reduce the probability of failure and to reduce moral 
hazard by forcing bank shareholders to bear a larger share 
of the losses experienced by the claimants on the cash flows 
of distressed firms.
Along with most observers, we are of the view that re-
quiring appropriate levels of capital is critical to achieving 
a safe and sound banking system. Unfortunately, we also 
believe, for several reasons, that reasonably stringent bank 
capital requirements, while important, are only part of a 
properly functioning regulatory and governance system. 
Among our concerns about relying too heavily on bank 
capital requirements to avoid the financial meltdowns associ-
ated with banking crises is that “banks can respond to 
higher capital requirements in ways that make them less 
rather than more safe.”68 For example, banks avoid 
com plying with the spirit of higher capital requirements by 
selling risky assets to “off-balance-sheet” entities, such as 
Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) and Variable Interest 
Entities (VIEs). Banks also can limit the effectiveness of 
higher capital requirements by investing in increasingly 
risky assets. Doing this increases the expected returns on 
whatever new levels of capital are required. This strategy 
is effective because risk weightings are distributed among 
rather crude categories of assets and often do not adequately 
reflect the true risk of the assets in a particular risk-weighting 
category, either because the chosen weights are wrong or 
because the categories are too broad.69
Another problem with bank capital requirements is that 
capital levels do not adjust at nearly the same speed at which 
assets can deteriorate. Many examples from the 2008 financial 
crisis illustrate this observation, as financial firms that were 
considered well-capitalized became insolvent in days, some-
times in mere hours. During the financial crisis, a number of 
financial institutions saw their capital levels, as expressed as 
Tier 1 common equity, erode by more than 500 basis points.70 
A study by the Federal Reserve has shown that even the higher 
proposed levels of capital used in the Basel III rules, which 
establish a minimum Tier 1 common equity plus the conserva-
tion buffer of 7 percent for most banks and 8 to 9.5 percent for 
systemically important financial institutions, would not have 
been sufficient for some banks.71
68 Elliott (2010, 17).
69 Hoenig (2013).
70 Rosengren (2013, Figure 1).
71 Rosengren (2013).
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Thus, bank capital requirements need to be set in coordina-
tion with other regulations and with a good system of 
supervision and examinations, ideally aided by transparent 
accounting that allows the capital markets and ratings agen-
cies to form their own judgments about the true riskiness of 
the activities of the banks. Simply put, “high capital levels 
alone are not enough.”72
Bank liquidity requirements raise similar issues. The OCC, the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the FDIC 
recently issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that would 
impose a quantitative liquidity requirement consistent with 
the liquidity coverage ratio established by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision.73 The liquidity coverage ratio proposal 
would apply to specified financial companies with $250 billion or 
more in total consolidated assets or $10 billion or more in 
on-balance-sheet foreign exposure; to systemically important 
nonbank financial institutions; and to banking subsidiaries of one 
of these companies that have assets of $10 billion or more. The 
purpose of the proposed liquidity coverage ratio is to strengthen 
the liquidity risk management of the companies to which it 
applies by requiring them to keep certain levels of high-quality 
liquid assets in order to meet the proposed rule’s quantitative 
liquidity standard. The quantitative liquidity standard is the ratio 
of a company’s high-quality liquid assets to its projected net cash 
outflows over a thirty-day period. A company would have to cal-
culate and maintain a liquidity coverage ratio equal to or greater 
than 1.0 on each business day.74
In our view, the proposed liquidity requirements, like the 
capital ratios discussed above, are not a panacea for the broad 
societal externalities created by bank crises. While liquidity is 
important, liquidity does not measure solvency. It measures only 
the ability of a firm to meet its short-term, immediate require-
ments for cash. Still more is needed.
3.4 Enhanced Duty of Care
Another important way that bank regulation and bank corpo-
rate governance standards differ from those of other types of 
corporations is that bank directors have historically been held 
72 Rosengren (2013).
73 See Federal Reserve, “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FRS-2013-0354-0001. 
74 “Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards, and 
Monitoring” (PDF): See “Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity 
Risk Measurement, Standards, and Monitoring,” December 2010, available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf , and “Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio and Liquidity Risk Monitoring Tools,” January 2013, available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf . 
to higher standards than other directors.75 Specifically, the fidu-
ciary duty of care, which is the duty to make reasonable, fully 
informed decisions and to engage in the levels of monitoring 
and oversight of risk that are sufficient to the particular needs of 
the business, has been enforced more strictly against bank di-
rectors than directors of other companies. Courts attribute their 
tougher enforcement of directors’ duties to the fact that “banks 
are charged with serving the public interest, not just the inter-
ests of the shareholders.”76
It is highly significant, in our view, that courts have histori-
cally held directors of banks not merely to the standard to 
which they held other corporate directors, but to a higher stan-
dard that encompassed the concept of professionalism. Courts 
would, for example, impose personal liability on bank directors 
who approved transactions that were deemed to be “so improvi-
dent, so risky, so unusual and unnecessary as to be contrary to 
fundamental conceptions of prudent banking practices.”77 
Requiring bank directors to conform to prudent banking prac-
tices brought the standards for bank directors close to the 
standards imposed on professionals such as doctors and engi-
neers. These professionals must perform their functions to the 
standards generally held by those in their profession.
In contrast, in the corporate world in general, directors and 
officers are required to act and to make decisions in the same 
manner as a reasonable person would believe appropriate 
under similar circumstances.78 Put simply, directors of most 
U.S. corporations are held to the same negligence standard as 
people participating in any amateur activity, such as recre-
ational golf or pleasure driving. Conduct that meets the 
standards expected of nonprofessionals is all that is required.
As noted above, this low standard for director conduct stands 
in sharp contrast to the conduct required of professionals. The 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act 
of 1989 (FIRREA)79 formally eliminated from U.S. common 
law the notion of higher standards for bank directors:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution 
may be held personally liable for monetary damages . . .  
for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or 
conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty 
of care (than gross negligence) including intentional 
75 Macey and O’Hara (2003, 111).
76 Macey and O’Hara (2003, 111).
77 Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 667 (1940).
78 Model Business Corporation Act, § 8.30(b). 
79 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k).
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tortious conduct, as such terms are defined and 
determined under applicable State law.80
By affirming that bank directors need only meet the 
standard of gross negligence for personal liability, FIRREA 
removed a potentially effective mechanism for incentivizing 
bank directors to consider the risk posed by banks to the 
greater financial system. We will return to this issue in the 
next section, but we note for now that the notion that U.S. 
bank directors could (and should) face higher burdens than 
other directors has long antecedents.
3.5 Global Approaches—Duty of Trust 
and Strict Liability
Outside the United States, bank directors have faced significantly 
higher burdens, with some jurisdictions viewing bank failures as 
a criminal offense on the part of directors. Brazil, for example, 
holds banks’ executives and directors personally liable for the 
debts of failed institutions even when no fault is proven.81 The 
U.K. government, following on the recommendation of the 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, recently 
introduced a new criminal offense for reckless misconduct in 
the management of a bank. This criminal liability would apply 
to both executive and non-executive directors of a bank.82 The 
maximum sentence for the offense is seven years in prison, an 
unlimited fine, or both.
The notion that “reckless management” is a crime is rather 
alien to the U.S. perspective that business failure is not a criminal 
offense but rather a natural, albeit unfortunate, outcome of busi-
ness judgment in an uncertain world. In our view, criminalizing 
bank failure is not a viable approach to resolving the difficulties 
of bank corporate governance. It does, however, change the 
calculus for bank directors with respect to the acceptable level 
of risk for a financial institution.
A similar change in calculus can arise from the concept 
found in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria called Untreue. 
This “breach of trust” is defined as “a derogation of duty that 
causes real harm to the institution,” and it has been the basis for 
charges against bankers at WestLB, BayernLB, HSH Nordbank, 
80 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k).
81 “Prosecuting Bankers: Blind Justice,” The Economist, May 4, 2013.
82 HM Treasury, “Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill, Government 
Amendments: Criminal Sanctions,” October 2013, available at https://www 
.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/245758/
HoL_Policy_Brief_-_Criminal_Sanctions.pdf.
and Sal. Oppenheim.83 Indeed, the chief executive officer of 
WestLB paid a fine of 150,000 euros to settle charges relating 
to breach of trust. More intriguing are the cases involving 
board members of these failed financial institutions. The 
management board of the German bank HSH Nordbank 
went on trial for breach of trust stemming from risk man-
agement failures relating to a collateralized debt obligation 
(CDO) and other off-balance-sheet activities that resulted in 
the bank having to be bailed out to the tune of 30 billion 
euros.84 This case, which represented the first time German 
prosecutors had tried to blame an entire board for a bank’s 
failure, ended in an acquittal for all defendants.85 Similarly, 
seven former directors of Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, 
or LBBW, Germany’s largest public sector lender, were 
charged with breach of trust in connection with moving 
risky assets to special purpose vehicles allegedly to hide the 
riskiness of the bank. This case ended in settlement, with the 
directors of LBBW agreeing to make contributions to charity 
in lieu of fines.86
In the United States, bank directors and managers can be 
criminally prosecuted for fraud and for violating federal securities 
laws or provisions of those laws, and such was the fate that 
befell more than 800 bankers jailed in the aftermath of the 
savings-and-loan crisis. But pursuing such cases, particularly 
against bank directors, is notoriously difficult owing to the 
challenge of linking wrongdoing to those actually running the 
bank.87 The rarity of this outcome means that bank director 
behavior is unlikely to be affected.
What is clear from this review is that corporate gover-
nance problems are remarkably resilient. While some 
approaches have been more successful than others, in 
general even the most extreme outside constraints have 
failed to resolve bank governance problems. In our view, 
this suggests that it would be wise to use a new approach, 
one that explicitly recognizes the inherent difficulty of man-
aging and controlling risk in the post-crisis era.
83 HM Treasury, “Financial Services Bill.” 
84 This duty of trust does not just attach to financial firms. Board members 
of the German firm Mannesmann were also charged with Untreue in 
connection with that firm’s takeover by Vodaphone last year. See “Breach 
of Trust? German Corporate Governance is Literally on Trial,” The 
Economist, February 20, 2013.
85 For details on this verdict, see http://www.dw.com/en/hsh-nordbank 
-executives-acquitted-for-financial-crisis-wrongdoing/a-17769276. 
86 “German Court Closes LBBW Bank Case with Settlement,” Reuters, 
April 24, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
lbbw-courts-idUSL6N0NG3BF20140424.
87 “Prosecuting Bankers: Blind Justice,” The Economist.
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4. Bank Governance in the 
Post-Crisis World: A Proposal
Several factors suggest that it may be time to impose a more rig-
orous standard on the directors of certain financial institutions, 
particularly those institutions deemed to be systemically import-
ant by regulatory authorities. The fact that an institution is 
systemically important seems to us reason enough to expect di-
rectors of such institutions to be able to perform their functions 
at the level of other directors at comparable financial institutions. 
The vast complexity not only of the businesses of banking and 
finance but also of the laws and regulations that govern financial 
institutions, particularly in the wake of Dodd-Frank, provide ad-
ditional support for the argument that bank directors should be 
held to higher standards than the amateur standard that governs 
directors generally. Our proposal here is particularly relevant for 
directors of bank holding companies, who currently face no 
special requirements as to qualifications.88
While our proposal that bank directors should have special 
expertise is new, the idea that corporate directors in general 
should have special expertise is not new, though the idea has not 
been well developed in the literature. Some scholars define the 
term “professional director” simply as a director who serves on 
multiple boards and adduce evidence that board membership of 
such professional directors correlates with improved performance 
for the companies on whose boards those directors serve.89 
Others use the term “professional” to refer to the particular, 
industry-specific expertise that certain directors have.90 We use 
the term in the latter sense.
Among the earliest and most persuasive arguments for requir-
ing corporate directors to have substantial industry-specific 
expertise was made by Yale law professor and future Supreme 
Court Justice William O. Douglas. Douglas (1934) argued that 
experts on the board “would be invaluable . . . in determining the 
course of conduct for the managers” and would be “better quali-
fied to determine financial and commercial policy.” For these 
reasons, Douglas argued that outside experts on boards of 
88 Interestingly, directors of subsidiary banks do face additional requirements. For 
example, the OCC notes in The Director’s Book that “In addition to the citizenship 
and residency requirements contained in 12 USC 72, the qualifications of a 
candidate seeking to become a member of the board of directors of a national 
bank include (1) basic knowledge of the banking industry, the financial regulatory 
system, and the laws and regulations that govern the operation of the institution; 
(2) willingness to put the interests of the bank ahead of personal interests; 
(3) willingness to avoid conflicts of interest; (4) knowledge of the communities 
served by the bank; (5) background, knowledge, and experience in business or 
another discipline to facilitate oversight of the bank; and (6) willingness and 
ability to commit the time necessary to prepare for and regularly attend board and 
committee meetings (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 2010, 4).
89 Keys and Li (2005).
90 Pozen (2010).
directors “should have a position of dominance and power on the 
board” so that they could “make their directive influence effective” 
by means of their “real power over executive management.”  
In arguing for directors with sufficient industry expertise, 
Robert Pozen has observed,
Lack of expertise among directors is a perennial 
problem. Most directors of large companies struggle 
to properly understand the business. Today’s 
companies are engaged in wide-ranging operations, 
do business in far-flung locations with global partners, 
and operate within complex political and economic 
environments. Some businesses, retailing, for one, are 
relatively easy to fathom, but others—aircraft 
manufacture, drug discovery, financial services, and 
tele communications, for instance—are technically 
very challenging. I remember catching up with a friend 
who had served for many years as an independent 
director of a technology company. The CEO had 
suddenly resigned, and my friend was asked to step 
in. “I thought I knew a lot about the company, but 
boy, was I wrong,” he told me. “The knowledge gaps 
between the directors and the executives are huge.” 
(Pozen 2010)
Just as the idea that some directors should be held to higher 
standards is not alien to the academic literature, neither is it new 
to policymakers. As noted above, Dodd-Frank requires that at 
least one of the members of the risk committees of BHCs and 
SIFIs must have risk management experience commensurate with 
the firm’s capital structure, risk profile, complexity, size, and activ-
ities. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act explicitly set higher requirements 
for qualified audit committees by requiring all members to be in-
dependent and at least one member to be a “financial expert” as 
defined by SEC rules.91 Indeed, one of the motivations behind 
Sarbanes-Oxley was to strengthen audit committees to “avoid 
future auditing breakdowns,” which were contributing to a loss of 
confidence in the integrity of U.S. companies and markets.92 Our 
argument here is that the failure of risk management at financial 
91 An “audit committee financial expert” is defined as a person who has the 
following attributes: (1) an understanding of generally accepted accounting 
principles and financial statements; (2) the ability to assess the general application 
of such principles in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals and 
reserves; (3) experience preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial 
statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting issues 
that are generally comparable to the breadth and complexity of issues that can 
reasonably be expected to be raised by the registrant’s financial statements, or 
experience actively supervising one or more persons engaged in such activities; 
(4) an understanding of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting; 
and (5) an understanding of audit committee functions.” See Trautman (2013).
92 See Senate Report No.107-205, as cited in Tsacoumis, Bess, and  
Sappington (2003).
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institutions, particularly systemically important ones, can lead to 
outcomes of even greater consequence, and that current steps are 
insufficient to address the magnitude of the problem of excessive 
risk taking by financial institutions.
How might such a system work? We suggest a two-part struc-
ture involving differential standards for both bank risk committee 
members and bank directors. With respect to risk committee 
members, we note that risk management of a complex financial 
institution is not something easily grasped by a typical corporate 
director; it instead requires specialized expertise. Indeed, the 
shareholder advisory services ISS and Glass Lewis both recom-
mended voting against the members of JPMorgan Chase’s Risk 
Committee, citing their lack of risk management experience. We 
believe that risk management committees should be composed 
only of individuals who can demonstrate expertise in evaluating 
and monitoring the risk control systems of a bank. Allowing 
“amateur hour” with respect to this oversight function at large 
complex financial institutions is simply irresponsible in post- 
crisis financial markets.
Such individuals, whom we will call “banking experts,” 
would have acquired, either through experience or education, 
the skills needed to monitor the risk management functions of 
the bank. For smaller financial institutions, the expertise re-
quired might be more limited, given that risk management at 
such institutions generally involves less complex methodologies 
(such as gap analysis, liquidity monitoring, and the like). For 
large, complex financial institutions, the needed skill set will be 
larger, requiring familiarity with risk modeling, valuation of 
complex derivatives, synthetic asset replication, hedging 
strategies, and so on. The specific qualifications for being a 
banking expert could be modeled after those required of 
audit committee financial experts.
Second, we also propose higher professional standards for 
bank directors. As we have argued in this article, bank corporate 
governance weaknesses pose an ongoing threat to the financial 
system. While heightened oversight of banks is surely called for, 
such oversight will be successful only to the extent that the direc-
tors of financial institutions have both the incentives and the 
experience and skill required to be successful in carrying out their 
oversight responsibilities. At a minimum, we believe bank direc-
tors should be “banking literate,” where such literacy is defined as 
an understanding of the basic functions of banking, the nature of 
risk in complex financial organizations, and the complex 
regulatory structure defining banking. Such literacy, which would 
be a prerequisite for becoming a director, could be acquired 
through experience or through education.
We suspect that some may object to these proposals on the 
grounds that if having more qualified directors was valuable, 
then bank shareholders would demand this on their own. 
Alternatively, others may argue that if higher requirements are 
desirable for banks, then perhaps they should be required of 
firms more generally. We think the response to both objections 
is actually the same: banks are different from other firms. As we 
have argued, bank shareholders do not have properly aligned 
incentives to limit bank risk, so externally imposed require-
ments may be necessary. Other firms can adequately address 
corporate governance deficiencies internally, so requiring 
higher standards for all corporate directors is unnecessary.
Another objection to our proposal involves a more 
subtle point about bank risk taking. There is empirical research 
that indicates that banks with more knowledgeable directors are 
more likely to take on greater risk than other banks. One 
could argue that our proposal could actually exacerbate the 
risk-taking problem at banks rather than ameliorate it because 
our proposal would place more knowledgeable directors on 
boards. We have two responses to this. First, ignorance is not a 
good strategy for risk control—relying on directors’ lack of 
knowledge to restrain risk is surely not a formula for a safe and 
sound banking system. We completely agree, however, that 
knowledge alone is not sufficient to achieve the goal of safety 
and soundness in banking. In addition to knowledge and 
competence, there must also be a culture within banks that 
considers prudent banking to be a way of life rather than an 
oxymoron. Culture starts at the top, so efforts by regulators to 
highlight the importance of cultural issues within banks should 
be viewed as fully compatible with our proposals to improve 
corporate governance in banking.
Finally, a legitimate concern is that our proposal would 
cause the demand for qualified bank directors to exceed the 
supply. We acknowledge that it will take time and effort to 
groom enough competent directors for all of the import-
ant financial firms in the economy. But if better directors 
result in creating better banks, then  the returns to searching 
for, educating, and empowering those directors will pay off 
for all concerned.
5. Conclusion
Who will control large, complex financial institutions? 
Without better corporate governance, the answer may be 
the regulators—or no one at all. In this article, we have set 
out the myriad problems connected with bank corporate 
governance and noted how these seem to have taken on even 
greater complexity in the post-crisis world. We have argued 
that bank governance needs to change to reflect the realities 
of complex financial organizations. Our proposal to impose 
higher professional standards on bank directors and risk 
committee members is a first step in that direction.
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